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Sir Edward Grey, Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War:  
A Re-Evaluation1 
Abstract 
Historians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for 
contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic 
advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical 
debates around the significance of Grey’s policy towards Germany in the events that led to 
the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany 
on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of 
Grey’s policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by 
the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey’s 
position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in 
July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics 
and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the 
continent who were bent on war.  
 
Introduction: the ‘men of 1914’ 
 
While there remains much dispute about the origins of the First World War, many historians 
agree that people, the so-called ‘men of 1914’2, rather than structures or impersonal forces, 
unleashed this war. War came as a ‘result of a series of deliberations by a handful of men.’3 
While not everyone agrees on the origins of the war, or even whether there is still a need to 
attribute ‘war guilt’ at all, it is undisputed that key decision-makers (indeed all of them men) 
took the fateful decisions of 1914. As Gordon Martel notes: 
It was the choices that men made during those fateful days that plunged the 
world into a war. […] The choices they made were rational, carefully 
calculated, premised on the assumptions and attitudes, ideas and experiences 
that they had accumulated over the years. Real people, actual flesh-and-blood 
human beings, were responsible for the tragedy of 1914 […].4 
Even those who emphasise the crucial role played by contingency attribute agency and 
significance to key individuals, arguing that ‘[i]f any one of these leaders had acted 
differently […], he might well have interrupted the slide into war’. 5 This view is not new; 
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contemporaries also addressed the role of individuals in their assessments of the war’s causes. 
In his War Memoirs, for example, David Lloyd George declared that it was ‘a mistaken view 
of history to assume that its episodes were entirely due to fundamental causes which could 
not be averted, and that they were not precipitated or postponed by the intervention of 
personality.’6 
Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 1916, is one of the leaders of whom 
it is often said that he should have acted differently in the summer of 1914, or indeed that he 
should have steered British foreign policy along a different path before the final crisis. Within 
the Cabinet, and supported by the Prime Minister, ‘Sir Edward Grey dominated the scene. By 
the summer of 1914 friend and foe alike referred not to the government’s foreign policy, but 
to Grey’s,’7 and indeed to this day British foreign policy in 1914 seems synonymous with 
Grey’s own.  
In trying to evaluate the role played by Grey in the events preceding the outbreak of war in 
1914, this article first provides a historiographical overview and examines some of the 
criticisms levelled at Grey, in terms of his pre-war anti-German foreign policy and his 
handling of the July Crisis in 1914. Part 2 traces Grey’s and Britain’s developing relationship 
with Germany in the years 1905 to 1914 and uncovers some of the ‘assumptions and 
attitudes, ideas and experiences’ that informed Grey’s views.8 In the final part, Grey’s 
decisions and his decision-making options are examined from the German perspective. While 
Grey appeared crucial to the decision-making process from an Anglo-centric viewpoint, it is 
argued here that he was marginal among the ‘men of 1914’ when viewed from Berlin, and 
that arguably he could not have affected a peaceful outcome to the July Crisis, whatever his 
intentions.  
 
1. Grey in the historiography of the war’s origins 
 
Contemporaries and historians have been divided in their assessments of Sir Edward Grey’s 
role as Foreign Secretary. Over the last hundred years Grey has variously been portrayed as 
‘a clever Machiavellian politician’ or ‘a baffled and groping minister…’.9 Even before the 
war had begun, there were disagreements about his role and ability, as interventionists and 
non-interventionists found plenty to criticise in Grey. For some, he was the civilian donkey 
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who led his country into a war that had perhaps been avoidable, and like Sir Douglas Haig he 
would be blamed when that war did not go to plan.10  
After the war, Grey was frequently targeted in the booming British memoir literature. As the 
debate on the origins of the war continued throughout the twentieth century, so too did 
disagreements about Grey. Common to all assessments, however, was the view that he was 
central for the British decision for war, and that he had the potential to affect a different 
outcome to the crisis. The arguments centre on two main aspects of Grey’s role: his pre-war 
leadership and his role in the July Crisis. For the former, the question is to what extent his 
anti-German stance affected Anglo-German relations in the years before the First World War, 
and more recently whether perhaps a German threat was invented or even provoked because 
this was a useful ruse for strengthening British ties with the Entente. For the latter, it has been 
debated whether Grey could have acted differently in July 1914 to avoided a British entry 
into the war, perhaps even stop a continental war by restraining Germany with a clear 
message about British intervention, and whether his mediation proposals during the crisis 
were genuine.  
More recently, the charge that his decision, and Britain’s entry into the war, turned this 
European war into a world war has been added to a long list of reprimands. Thus it has been 
argued by German historians recently that in 1914, Britain was the only great power which 
could have stayed neutral. Her own interests were not directly affected by a local conflict 
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (a somewhat disingenuous argument given that by 
August, the conflict had shifted from the Balkans to the Channel coast), and that she was not 
bound by a formal alliance which would have forced her to intervene. ‘Only Britain’s entry 
into the war turned the original conflict into a global disaster’, it is claimed in the most recent 
instalment of the long debate on the origins of the war.11 
There is certainly agreement that Grey, faced with Germany threatening Britain’s 
international position on the one hand and the strengthening Russia becoming an ever more 
frightening potential future enemy on the other, was ‘compelled to walk a dangerous tight-
rope’.12 But more recently historians have questioned the view that Germany challenged the 
international status quo and that Britain had no choice but to react to this threat. Instead, they 
have highlighted the perceived threat that Russia posed to the British Empire and that 
influenced British decision-making before and during the July Crisis.13 
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At the time, German views were less divided. German decision-makers and historians who 
attempted to show that Germany had fought a defensive war in 1914 almost universally 
blamed Grey’s alleged duplicity vis-à-vis Germany for the outbreak of war. However, views 
on Grey shifted over time, and by the 1960s, when a new consensus about the origins of the 
war was reached, Grey was portrayed as one of the few honest men of 1914 who had 
attempted to prevent the outbreak of war. This view has, however, been revised more 
recently, with more critical interpretations of Grey coming once again to the fore. The 
following section provides a chronological overview of this shifting historiography. 
*** 
Even before war had broken out, the view from Berlin in early August 1914 was unequivocal, 
as summarized by some of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s infamous angry marginal notes: ‘Herr Grey is 
a false dog who is afraid of his own baseness and false policy, but who does not wish openly 
to take position against us.’14 Sir Edward Grey was variously ‘a false rascal’, ‘mad or an 
idiot’, or a ‘scoundrel’. This vitriol had its roots in misunderstandings during the July Crisis 
when the German leaders hoped for British neutrality in a continental war. Their bitter 
disappointment led to feelings of betrayal, and Sir Edward Grey became one of the focal 
points of this German resentment. 
At the same time in Britain, Grey’s conduct during the July Crisis also had his fair share of 
critics.15 They claimed that a firm stance early in the crisis would have changed Berlin’s 
resolve, and deplored his perceived indecisiveness and his desire to keep the peace until very 
late in the crisis. Sir Eyre Crowe, not known as a lover of Germany, considered Grey to have 
acted in a cowardly way. In December 1919, he complained to General Sir Henry Wilson 
about ‘the hopelessness and timidity of Grey.’ Wilson recorded that Crowe’s ‘stories showed 
what a futile useless weak fool the man was – and is. In 1914 he was determined not to go to 
war if by any conceivable means he could shirk his duties.’16  
On 25 July, even before the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was known, 
Crowe noted that Britain would be dragged into a war regardless, but that Germany would 
give way if Britain declared her solidarity with France and Russia. ‘There is still the chance 
that she can be made to hesitate, if she can be induced to apprehend that the war will find 
England by the side of France and Russia.’17 Crowe had changed his mind on this by 31 July, 
but, as Herbert Butterfield points out, in his earlier views ‘he has been followed by a number 
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of historians, who feel that Grey ought to have made the Germans realize Britain’s 
determination to act with the other Entente powers.’18  
Lord Lansdowne’s post-war assessment sums up what many thought. ‘I have always believed 
that war might have been avoided if Grey had been in a position to make a perfectly explicit 
statement as to our conduct in certain eventualities.’ However, he conceded that the blame 
was not necessarily Grey’s, who ‘would himself have been ready enough to make such a 
statement.’19 He lacked the support of the Cabinet and therefore his hands were tied. Others 
who worked closely with Grey in 1914, like his assistant private secretary William Tyrrell, 
looked back in 1934 to Grey’s ‘terrific dilemma, knowing what was at stake, desiring to bring 
in a united country, desiring to avoid an internal crisis lest the Germans should slip into Paris 
before Great Britain had made up her mind.’20 
Any critics of Grey had to consider the fact that highlighting his failings would play into the 
hands of German apologists who portrayed the war as having been caused by the Entente 
powers. In a 1919 publication, and in view of the fact that ‘the German militarists are never 
tired of saying that Great Britain planned this war’, Lord Loreburn asserted that in 1914 Grey 
had ‘exhausted every effort he could think of to convince all the nations concerned of the 
danger that was at hand.’21  Nonetheless, he concluded in 1919 that Britain’s focus on the 
Entente was at the heart of its inevitable entry into the war:  
we were brought into the war because Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey and their 
confidants […] had placed us in such a position toward France, and therefore also 
toward Russia, that they found they could not refuse to take up arms on her behalf 
when it came to the issue, though till the end they denied it to Parliament, and 
probably even to themselves.22  
David Lloyd George used his War Memoirs to enhance his own reputation while launching a 
merciless attack on Grey. He was among Grey’s most vociferous critics, blaming both the 
personality of the Foreign Secretary (‘He altogether lacked that quality of audacity which 
makes a great Minister’) and his mistakes for the outcome of the crisis (Grey hoped ‘that war 
could be averted by quieter and more conventional methods’).23 His central role was not in 
doubt: ‘In the policy which led up to our participation in the War, Sir Edward Grey, amongst 
the British statesmen, played the leading part.’24 Nor was there any doubt that ‘he failed 
calamitously in his endeavours to avert the Great War.’25 
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As George W. Egerton explains, ‘[p]art of this savaging of Grey can be better understood if 
the foreign secretary is seen as representing for Lloyd George British Liberalism's broader 
failure to generate effective leadership in face of the challenge of modern war.’26 Whatever 
his motivation, Lloyd George’s cutting critique of Grey had a lasting effect of the Foreign 
Secretary’s reputation. 
According to Lloyd George, Grey was ‘a pilot whose hand trembled in the palsy of 
apprehension, unable to grip the levers and manipulate them with a firm and clear purpose.’27 
He was certain that the Foreign Secretary could have affected a different outcome during the 
July crisis: 
Had he warned Germany in time of the point at which Britain would declare war – 
and wage it with her whole strength – the issue would have been different. […] 
And he could have uttered this warning in sufficient time to leave the German 
authorities without any excuse for not changing their dust-laden plans.28 
However, it was clear to contemporaries that such vicious attacks on the former Foreign 
Secretary could have unintended, but serious, consequences. Thus, for example, a worried 
Jan Christian Smuts, former member of the War Cabinet and South African prime minister, 
warned Lloyd George that his portrayal of Grey would ‘shatter very much all the British 
case’ on the coming of the war, which rested on ‘Grey’s honesty, and good faith, and 
ability.’29 By this time, however, a new consensus had moved away from blaming individual 
governments for the outbreak of war in favour of seeing the war as an act of fate rather than 
the result of deliberate intention. This meant that both Germany, the country blamed for 
starting the war, and Grey, the leader accused of mishandling the crisis, were off the hook. 
The shift was encapsulated in Lloyd George’s often-quoted memoirs which claimed that 
Europe’s nations had ‘slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war’.30 
The many negative assessments of Grey echoed what the German government had argued all 
along: Britain, not Germany, had caused this war by virtue of the underhand game she had 
played in 1914. Proving Germany’s innocence and blaming others, including Britain, for the 
outbreak of the war had been of paramount importance to German innocence accounts from 
the summer of 1914 onwards, and to the national revisionist agenda that shaped German 
views of the origins of the war after 1919. The German disappointment about a perceived 
British betrayal began during the July Crisis, and their anger focused on King George V and 
Sir Edward Grey whose foreign policy they considered duplicitous. The German government 
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had hoped, against the odds, for British neutrality until the last days of the crisis, and felt it 
had been led astray by Grey’s unwillingness to commit Britain one way or the other, i.e. to 
decide in favour of neutrality and abandon its Entente partners, or to decide to back France 
and Russia and send an unequivocal signal to Berlin. In the post-war years, this negative view 
of Grey was further cemented in the revisionist literature which argued against German ‘war 
guilt’ and sought to place blame for the outbreak of the war on Britain’s foreign policy during 
the July Crisis, much like Smuts had feared. Eventually, however, this was no longer an 
overriding concern as revisionist interpretations had become the accepted orthodoxy.31 
British views of Grey were not universally negative. In an article of 1934, written in response 
to Lloyd George’s damning indictment, Arthur Murray presented a more favourable 
impression of the former Foreign Secretary.  Among his ‘most outstanding’ character traits he 
listed ‘sympathy, tolerance, a sense of fair play and justice, and an ardent desire for peace 
between the nations’.32 And he cites the United States’ wartime Secretary of War, Newton D. 
Baker, who declared that ‘if any human agency could have prevented the World War, Sir 
Edward Grey would have prevented it.’33 According to another more well-meaning 
assessment, Grey had ‘enjoyed tremendous honor as an elder statesman, a living symbol of 
Britain’s reluctant but righteous entry into the war.’34 Certainly most contemporary 
commentators agreed that he occupied a position of considerable influence. He used his 
‘enormous personal power’, in the words of editor H.A. Gwynne from the Morning Post, to 
‘force his views on the Cabinet and the country, and was, according to Charles Hobhouse, the 
Postmaster-General, ‘the author of our rupture with Germany’.35 While his influence and role 
were thus disputed, his importance was never in any doubt. 
During and immediately after the Second World War, there was little appetite for revisiting 
the origins of the First in general, or for examining Grey’s role in this in particular. One 
notable exception is the work of the Italian historian Luigi Albertini, who produced a detailed 
study of the diplomatic origins of the war in which he interrogated the actions of all the pre-
war leaders, among them Grey. His was neither a damning nor a particularly complimentary 
portrayal of Grey. Albertini was critical of Grey’s decision-making around the infamous 
‘misunderstanding’ of 1 August, when it appeared as if Grey was offering the prospect of 
British and possibly even French neutrality. ‘Grey’s blunder […] is inexplicable,’ Albertini 
charged.36 However, as regards Grey’s refusal to promise British neutrality in return for a 
German assurance that she would not violate Belgium, ‘a capital charge against him by 
writers and historians hostile to him’, he concludes that ‘Grey acted perfectly rightly.’ 
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Albertini’s view of Grey is that he was honestly striving towards maintaining peace: ‘while 
Germany on 1 August was blowing up bridges and setting her course for war, Grey up to the 
last moment worked for peace even when refusing to promise English neutrality in return for 
Germany’s respecting Belgian neutrality.’ While honourable, this attitude was, however, 
based on the hope for ‘bogus resumption at the eleventh hour of direct conversations between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg.’37 Moreover, Albertini’s detailed study of the documents suggests 
to him that, in early August, ‘Grey was not frank with Lichnowsky.’ Here was ‘another 
instance of the way he always failed to speak plainly to him, thus misleading the German 
Government one may truly say, right up to the very last moment.’38 
A pronounced shift in the historiography of the origins of the war occurred with the 
publication of Fritz Fischer’s work in the 1960s, and the subsequent new debates. Fischer’s 
publications pointed once again at evidence for Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of 
the war.39 In this interpretation, Britain and Grey were seen as having played a much more 
benign role. According to Fischer, there could not have been any doubt in Germany as to 
Britain’s likely attitude in a future war. As early as 1912, there had been clear warnings from 
London. Kaiser Wilhelm’s many angry marginal notes on this subject make it plain that it 
was known in Berlin that Britain had declared its solidarity with France in the event of a war 
between Germany and France, ‘but nonetheless he was willing to have a warlike 
confrontation with them even under this constellation.’40 In this interpretation, in 1912, as 
again in 1914, the German government’s mind was made up, regardless of Grey’s actions.  
As to Fischer’s assertions about the aggressive nature of German foreign policy, based on 
their detailed study of British foreign policy making, Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson 
concluded more recently: ‘Little that Fritz Fischer has written would have surprised Nicolson 
or Crowe, or General Wilson. But their views were not shared by Grey or the Cabinet. These 
men believed that peace was the natural condition of man and that it could be maintained by 
rational decisions.’41 If Fischer was correct in identifying a desire to ‘grasp world power’ on 
Germany’s part, then arguably Grey’s diplomacy was powerless, however well-intentioned it 
may have been. 
As a result of the shifting views concerning Germany’s significant role in the events that led 
to war during and after the Fischer controversy, Grey became widely regarded as having 
acted with honest intentions, but from an unenviable and ultimately impossible position.42 
Thus, for example, Steiner and Neilson assert that  ‘Grey could not concede that any 
government could knowingly unleash such a catastrophe and hoped that Britain’s naval 
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margin and diplomatic disposition would deter the Germans’, and they ask  ‘[w]hat 
alternative policies, if any, existed that might have proved superior to the one that Grey 
followed? Had Grey committed Britain […] to France and Russia, would this have prevented 
Vienna and Berlin from going to war in 1914?’ In their assessment, that was ‘debatable’.43 
Others concur that events were beyond Grey’s control. Samuel R. Williamson and Ernest 
May conclude that Grey ‘never appreciated the rapidity with which decisions were being 
made, nor that unspoken assumptions, preexisting military plans, and internal politics in all 
continental capitals dramatically limited his opportunities for success.’44 It would appear that 
some of his contemporary critics also failed to understand the limitations that were placed on 
him. 
In the historiography of the last decades of the twentieth century, Grey’s actions in July 1914 
have generally been seen as an expression of a genuine desire to prevent an escalation of the 
crisis. Among the most important ‘men of 1914’, he emerged as the least responsible for the 
outbreak of war. In an historiographical landscape that was until recently dominated by a 
watered-down Fischerite view, Grey was portrayed as one of the very few ‘men of 1914’ who 
honestly worked for peace, along with Germany’s Ambassador in London, Prince 
Lichnowsky.45 Both of them have been seen as attempting to prevent the escalation of the 
crisis and trying to mediate for peace. In his recent account of the July Crisis, Thomas Otte 
reiterates this view: among the key players of the crisis, Grey and Lichnowsky were ‘the two 
honourable men’.46  
However, with the advent of a post-Fischer revisionist literature, Grey’s role has once again 
been revised. On the eve of the centenary of the war’s outbreak the debate took yet another 
new turn with the publication of Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers.47 Clark advances a 
different interpretation of the well-meaning advocate of mediation who had emerged post-
Fischer, and considers his often praised proposal for a four-power conference to have been 
‘half-hearted’ and ‘founded upon a partisan indifference to the power-political realities of 
Austria-Hungary’s situation.’48 Moreover, he proposes that a different development to Anglo-
German relations might have been imaginable:  
Had Grey and his associates failed to secure so many influential posts, less 
intransigent voices […] might have found a wider hearing. Instead, the Grey 
group gradually tightened their grip on British policy, setting the terms under 
which relations with Germany were viewed and understood.49 
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Similar criticism have previously been raised by Keith Wilson who considers ‘Grey’s 
personal responsibility for the British decision for war’ to have been ‘considerable’.50 He has 
argued that the German threat was an ‘invention’ and that ‘some of the claims made about 
Germany were so remarkable as to be quite hysterical,’ suggesting that Grey could have 
pursued a less anti-German foreign policy in the years before 1914, perhaps with a different 
outcome.51  Some conspiracy theorists have even suggested that Grey was a member of a 
secret elite plotting war, though this extreme view is not widely shared in the 
historiography.52 
For another recent contributor to the debate, Sean McMeekin, Grey committed what he calls 
‘sins of omission, not commission’.53 He was sending ‘misleading positive signals’ to Berlin, 
and McMeekin accuses Grey of ‘feigning neutrality and yet clearly taking the Franco-Russian 
side’. For McMeekin, ‘Britain’s role in unleashing the First World War was one born of 
blindness and blundering, not malice.’54 It is, however, hard to find evidence of these alleged 
misleading positive signals in the correspondence between Lichnowsky in London and the 
Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin. Rather, the German Ambassador repeatedly expressed his 
concern about the possibility of a British involvement in the war, based on his frequent 
conversations with Grey. Regardless of clear evidence to the contrary, Bethmann Hollweg 
speculated in March 1914 if there were to be a war between Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
France and Russia, ‘then England would probably initially remain neutral,’ and that she 
‘would intervene if France [were] defeated.’55 In July, this hope still remained despite clear 
warnings from Lichnowsky. 
However, conversely, it has also been argued that Grey was ‘misinformed’ or even 
‘disinformed’ by Lichnowsky about Germany’s plans during the July Crisis.56  Indeed, it is 
clear that in July 1914 the ambassador was kept in the dark about Berlin’s real intentions. The 
Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin did not trust its own ambassador because it was known that 
Lichnowsky wanted to preserve peace at all cost. On 7 July, for example, Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg complained that Lichnowsky was ‘much too blue-eyed 
[vertrauensseelig]. Was being duped by the English.’57 This ‘disinformation’, Keith Wilson 
argues, led to ‘Grey’s misplaced confidence in Berlin’ which in turn enabled him to ‘ignore 
the increasingly alarmist reports from Vienna that an unacceptable ultimatum was being 
prepared.’58 
Grey may also have sent confusing signals unwittingly. As Jörn Leonhard explains, it was, 
tragically, his very willingness to negotiate and mediate which fed German belief in 
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neutrality even though Grey’s Foreign Office had actually sent clear signals to the contrary 
throughout the crisis, and indeed throughout his period in office.59 Moreover, in July 1914, 
the mediation proposals caused uncertainty which ‘fed hopes on the side of the Reich-
leadership, particularly with Bethmann Hollweg personally, that Britain would remain 
neutral’.60  
Despite such criticism, it is important to note that clear messages about Britain’s attitude 
were given, for example during the Agadir Crisis and again in July 1914. Consequently, the 
German government should have been in no doubt about Britain’s attitude in July 1914, and 
yet, they indulged in illusions of British neutrality until the very last days of peace. They 
simply did not believe the warnings. Their decisions did not depend on Britain’s neutrality, 
they merely hoped for it as it would guarantee a more favourable outcome of the crisis – an 
almost certain defeat of France. 
However, even allowing for the possibility that Grey’s mediation sent the wrong signal to 
Berlin, when by the end of July the message from London was clear, there was in any case, as 
Gerd Krumeich puts it, no evidence that Germany was ‘particularly impressed’ by Britain’s 
attitude.61 And while Grey’s hands were tied by the Cabinet’s indecision, Germany’s 
decision-makers were actually unaware of this. An example of this is reaction in Berlin to 
news from London which followed the Cabinet’s decision, of 29 July, essentially not to 
decide anything. As a result of the discussions that day, the German ambassador Lichnowsky 
was told not to reckon with British neutrality, and France and Russia were told that Britain 
was under no obligation to intervene. Grey would later be blamed for this alleged duplicity, 
‘entirely unfairly’, finds Gerd Krumeich.62 Crucially, Berlin took Britain’s declaration of that 
day at face value and did not consider the British government to be as yet undecided. Of 
course it would not have known of the contradictory advice given to Paris and St Petersburg. 
This explains the Kaiser’s angry outbursts in the marginal notes he penned on Lichnowsky’s 
telegram from London of that day.63 Wilhelm II and Bethmann did not know that at that stage 
only two Cabinet members favoured intervention - Churchill and Grey - and that a firm 
decision had not been taken (it would not be taken until 2 August). Wilhelm’s ‘seemingly 
crazy’ marginal notes, including his long notes on a telegram from German Ambassador in St 
Petersburg Friedrich von Pourtalès of 30 July in which he accused Britain of pursuing ‘anti-
German Weltpolitik’ are further evidence of the fact that in Berlin the assumption was that 
British neutrality was not really an option.64 In other words, seen from a different vantage 
point, Grey’s alleged or actual indecisiveness in the July Crisis was immaterial for decisions 
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taken in Berlin, and therefore for the outcome of the crisis. It is interesting to see that Grey 
appears to have understood this, even if later critics did not: ‘We [are] not deciding factor’, 
Grey stated in the discussions of 29 July when the Cabinet discussed whether the 1839 treaty 
was indeed a binding agreement.65 Even though this ‘critical Cabinet’ meeting had ‘decided 
not to decide’, as John Burns recorded,66 Keith Wilson points out that at least ‘the worst-case 
scenario’ had been avoided: having ‘to announce to the world at the present moment that in 
no circumstances would we intervene.’67 For Berlin, it seemed in any case a near certainty 
that London would not stand aside. However, this simply did not alter the course that it had 
determined on.68 
Other recent attempts to re-evaluate Britain’s pre-war policy and with it Grey’s role in the 
years before the outbreak of war include Andreas Rose’s account of British foreign policy 
before the First World War. He presents much evidence of contemporary criticism of Grey’s 
anti-German foreign policy, and shows that there was no overall agreement in Britain that 
Russia was the less dangerous of the two continental powers. The liberal weekly The Nation 
became a mouthpiece of critics within the party. In 1909, for example, it declared:  
It is not Germany which is looking at her “places in the sun”. It is France which is 
quietly attempting to absorb Morocco, and Russia which is intriguing. […] It is 
easy to talk of the danger of Germany “hegemony” in Europe. The expansive 
ambitions of other Powers are certainly more in evidence.69  
In Rose’s view, Whitehall’s foreign policy in the pre-war years, and during the Bosnian 
Annexation Crisis in particular, ‘did not have a de-escalating effect’, and London’s foreign 
policy was not solely aimed at maintaining the balance of power.70 The example of the 1908 
crisis shows, in Rose’s words, ‘that with their continuing declarations of loyalty vis-à-vis 
France and now also vis-à-vis Russia, Grey and his ministers increasingly robbed themselves 
of further options for peaceful crisis mediation.’71 Rose thus sees Grey as ‘one of the most 
responsible for the increasing frequency of crises, the loss of legitimacy of the system with 
the Central Powers, and eventually also the outbreak of war’.72 
In contrast with such recent critiques, and focusing on Grey’s actions in 1914 rather than the 
diplomacy of the pre-war years, T.G. Otte is unequivocal in his reinstatement of Grey: ‘there 
is no reason to doubt his genuine intentions’ when he put forward ‘an internationally 
guaranteed settlement rather like the 1913 Treaty of London, but based on “Halt in Belgrade” 
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and incorporating the Sazonov formula’, he asserts.73 Grey was a ‘man of action’ and there 
‘was nothing half-hearted or meandering about his policy.’74  
After a hundred years of debate on Grey’s role we are left with two diametrically opposed 
positions. If Grey’s responsibility for the outbreak of war is assumed by some and dismissed 
by others, it is undisputed that his resolve was essential for Britain’s entry into the war; 
against his opposition such a move would have been impossible. But it remains contested 
whether the Government under his leadership in the Foreign Office secretly committed 
Britain to France to such an extent that neutrality had become impossible. Did Grey fear 
Russia more than Germany, and did he deliberately invent a German threat? To answer these 
questions, the next section will look at Grey’s pre-war policy and his actions in July 1914. 
 
2. Grey and Germany, 1905 to 1914 
 
Throughout Grey’s time in office, Britain found herself in a precarious position vis-à-vis 
Germany on the one side, and France and Russia on the other. Even though there is no 
‘identity of opinion’ when it comes to Sir Edward Grey,75 under his leadership an anti-
German attitude was fostered, with a simultaneous commitment to the Entente and a growing 
apprehension of Russia. To what extent the German government was aware of this, and how 
much it influenced the way Germany perceived of its own predicament, is more difficult to 
ascertain.  
There is little doubt, however, that although a number of Cabinet members favoured a more 
pro-German line, ‘[d]issenting voices within the Foreign Office were marginalized.’76 Being 
pro-German in the Foreign Office in the years before the war was, in R.T.B. Langhorne’s 
words, ‘an unenviable position’.77 Clark argues that Grey’s accession to the Foreign Office 
‘consolidated the influence of an emergent anti-German faction within the British Foreign 
Office’, and that anti-German dispatches from abroad were favoured over more positive ones 
which would be ‘plastered with sceptical marginalia’.78 The overwhelming view of Germany 
in the Foreign Office was negative, and Grey even attributed to himself ‘anti-German 
prejudices’.79 In November 1909, Sir Charles Hardinge considered Germany ‘the only 
aggressive Power in Europe’.80 According to Clark, this ‘new virtual reality’, in which anti-
German assertions were repeated ‘mantra-like’, formed the background to Grey’s foreign 
policy in the years 1905-1914.81 
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However, even though there is agreement that the Foreign Office was dominated by anti-
German opinion, not everyone concurs that a German threat was invented by anti-German 
members of the Foreign Office, with predictions of the future which ‘would cross the 
threshold of the absurd’.82 Rather, Steiner and Neilson conclude that the ‘Foreign Office view 
of the German menace was entirely realistic.’ Moreover, ‘while Grey may have given 
Germany more attention that the other powers, this was not due to any ‘invention’ of a 
truculent Germany; that was created in Berlin.’83 
It is undisputed that France, not Germany, was the cornerstone of Grey’s foreign policy. 
Shortly before taking office in 1905, he outlined among his goals improved relations with 
Russia as well as with Germany, as long as such improvements did not ‘impair our existing 
good relations with France’.84 For Grey, maintaining the Entente with France remained a 
constant concern. He was keen to show that he had understood the importance of a British 
focus away from the concerns of Empire, and towards its continuing and increasing 
involvement on the continent.85  
By necessity, this commitment to France required cordial relations with Russia, while 
Germany’s aggressive and erratic foreign policy did not do her any favours. As Steiner and 
Neilson show, when Grey took office, ‘he had identified Germany as the threat if not the 
enemy; his anxieties were more pronounced than those of his political colleagues, as was his 
enthusiasm for a future Russian agreement.’86 All this stood Germany in bad stead, and any 
German hopes for British neutrality in a future war should have considered the reality of 
Britain’s increasingly precarious foreign policy position. Not being in a formal alliance with 
any European power made Britain potentially vulnerable, but it also restricted her choice for 
independent action. Arguably, however, the German government was unable to put itself in 
Britain’s position, just as Britain did not see international politics from the vantage point of 
Berlin. Both designed their foreign policy based on fear, while projecting onto the other an 
image of a threatening and envious enemy. 
There were attempts, however, to break this stalemate. In 1905, there was potential for more 
cordial relations with Berlin as a result of the new liberal government with a pro-German 
Minister of War, a fact that was not lost on Germany. Moreover, there were a number of 
public meetings and rallies which in favour of an Anglo-German détente.87 At the beginning 
of December 1905, the German ambassador Metternich wrote from London: ‘We are at the 
turning point in our relations with England‘. And he warned: ‘If we […] now coolly reject 
significant and spontaneous demonstrations of conciliatory attitudes, then we must give up 
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forever any hope of improving our relationship with England.’88 He appealed directly to the 
Chancellor to explain to the Kaiser that it could ‘only be beneficial to the German fatherland 
if the dangerous tension between the two nations is eased’ and urged that Germany should 
‘grasp the proffered hand’. But the Kaiser rejected this idea and would not believe ‘that 
England wants to keep on friendly terms with us.’89 
Grey’s proposal in May 1906, against the background of the forthcoming Peace Conference 
at The Hague, to discuss limiting the spending on naval expansion was seen by Wilhelm II as 
a trick ‘to prevent us building a big fleet.’ He would ‘certainly not’ agree. In response to the 
suggestion that the powers should communicate their naval programmes to each other before 
the conference he commented: ‘Oh, how cute.’ ‘So that England can always be warned in 
time to remain the strongest naval power.’90 As John Röhl shows, ‘[e]very initiative to halt 
the trend towards bigger and more expensive warships through international or bilateral 
agreement was rejected with fury by Wilhelm II’.91 He felt confident enough to turn down the 
détente feelers from London as well as the suggestions from President Roosevelt to limit all 
battleships to 15,000 tons in order to reign in the naval arms race: ‘Refuse!’ he ordered in 
October 1906. ‘Every state can build what suits it! No business of anyone else!’92 
It is impossible to say whether Britain’s motives really were as duplicitous as Wilhelm 
suspected, but with a prevailing attitude in Berlin that Grey could not be trusted, and an anti-
German attitude among influential members of the Foreign Office, what chance did any 
policy of conciliation ever have? Détente was only possible on Berlin’s terms, and these were 
incompatible with London’s focus on the Entente and with Britain’s own international role.  
Following the Algeciras Conference there was considerable anxiety in London that Germany 
might yet succeed in breaking apart the Entente, as had been its suspected (and actual!) 
intention during the Moroccan Crisis. This was reflected in high sensitivity about public 
evidence of an Anglo-German détente, e.g. with various official and royal visits in 1907.93 
An example of this sensitivity was a proposed visit of the Coldstream Guards band to 
Germany in 1907 which the Foreign Office feared might upset French sensibilities, as several 
different Anglo-German visits had already occurred that year. The King remarked on this 
occasion, as D.W. Sweet has put it, ‘that the Anglo-French entente must indeed be a fragile 
connection if it could be ruptured “on such a trumpery point”.’94 As Sweet has observed, 
Grey was convinced that ‘too much Anglo-German cordiality would make the French 
nervous about Britain’s commitment to the entente.’95 Anglo-German foreign policy was thus 
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conducted in a ‘climate of […] nervousness’,96 and increasingly also one of diminishing 
options. In February 1909, Grey summarized his position thus: ‘Real isolation of Germany 
would mean war: so would the domination of Germany in Europe. There is a fairly wide 
course between the two extremes in which European politics should steer.’97 
In 1911, Asquith set up a Cabinet Committee to discuss the question of a political agreement 
with Germany and naval expenditure reduction.98 Sir Arthur Nicolson worried that ‘there are 
in the Cabinet several members who desire to come to what they term a “friendly 
understanding” with Germany at almost any cost’.99 Following an ill-fated (and his last) visit 
by the Kaiser to England in May 1911, and based on what they could observe in the 
Wilhelmstrasse, there was little doubt in the Foreign Office that Germany was intent on 
achieving ‘hegemony in Europe’, as well as doubts about the Kaiser’s mental state. Asquith 
considered his ‘the workings of a disordered brain; but (even if that is so) they are none the 
less dangerous.’100 Wilhelm II had offended British sensibilities with his usual lack of tact, as 
well as making clear that Britain’s entry into a war on the continent would not make any 
difference to Germany: 
If we wish to fight, we will do so with or without your leave. And why? Because 
we Continental powers dispose of armies counting millions. Of what possible use 
would it be for you to land your 50,000 men anywhere? I am convinced you 
would never attempt anything so foolish […]. As to those French, we have beaten 
them once & we will beat them again.101 
In the light of such statements - and there were many more - it is difficult to sustain the 
argument that the Foreign Office invented a German threat. Judging by the rhetoric from 
Germany, the threat was indeed real. 
Following the announcement of the latest German naval laws in February 1912 Grey was 
convinced that the German navy might suddenly attack the British fleet.102 Relations had 
been made worse by the Agadir crisis and by the Mansion House Speech of 21 July 1911 – 
considered another ‘Olmütz’ in Germany which aroused widespread public condemnation.103 
On both sides of the channel the feeling was wide-spread that a major confrontation would 
sooner or later be unavoidable. Admiral Lord Fisher expected it to break out ‘in September 
1914’.104 Kaiser Wilhelm was convinced that as long as Grey was in post, ‘a proper political 
agreement cannot be achieved!’ In one of his typical angry marginal notes he lamented that 
Grey was not willing to come to an amicable arrangement with Germany. ‘He just will not! 
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and would only be forced to do so by the weight of hard facts.‘105 Forcing Britain into a 
friendly attitude was also at the heart of the Tirpitz Plan, but London would not be bullied 
into more cordial relations. The effect of Wilhelm’s and Germany’s posturing was only to 
strengthen the anti-German bias in London.  
As the example of the Haldane Mission of February 1912 reveals, the German government 
felt strong enough to be able to reject out of hand any tentative advances that did come from 
London. The negotiations failed because Germany demanded more than Britain felt able to 
offer – ideally neutrality – and because there was little appetite among members of the 
Foreign Office for ‘a so-called “understanding”’ with Germany, as Nicolson put it 
dismissively.106 In Berlin, there was no desire to come to anything but the most favourable 
agreement on Germany’s own terms. 
At various crucial junctures Grey made Britain’s attitude clear to the German government – 
the same position that he would maintain during the July Crisis. In March 1912 he informed 
the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir William Goschen: 
That day might come when a German Government might desire to crush France. 
If such a contingency arose, though our hands were quite free, as they were now, 
we might not be able to sit still: for we should feel that, if we did sit still, and 
allowed France to be crushed, we should have to fight later on.107 
Two days later, the British proposal for an agreement (the result of the so-called Haldane 
Mission) was received in Berlin – and it did not find imperial favour. Britain had made it 
clear that there could be no neutrality agreement. Indeed, Grey explained that he wanted to 
avoid that term altogether because it might provoke unwarranted expectations. At the same 
time Grey made clear what great confidence he had in Bethmann Hollweg’s desire for peace. 
‘We believed genuinely that he wished to pursue a straightforward policy of peace: and, as 
long as he remained German Chancellor, he might rely upon our co-operating with him to 
preserve the peace of Europe [...]’.108 
Grey had not been keen on the convention and had hoped, in Otte’s phrase, ‘to kick the 
matter into the long grass of diplomacy.‘109 For Bethmann Hollweg, the consequences of the 
failed talks were doubts about ‘Grey’s reliability, indeed his honesty.’110 This in turn, as Otte 
argues, made Austria-Hungary an even more important and indeed the only reliable ally for 
Germany and emphasized Germany’s perceived and actual isolation. In July 1914, such fears 
would play an important part in German decision-making. 
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Such tentative negotiations with Berlin notwithstanding, it must be remembered that 
Germany was not the only focus of Britain’s continental woes. J.A. Pease’s diary of March 
1912 makes clear how vulnerable the British government felt because of a lack of firm 
alliances on the continent:  
Grey’s recent interview with Metternich. Lloyd George and I pressed Grey to alter our 
words and introduce neutrality to please the Germans and play up to Bethmann. It was 
agreed we should invite the Germans to criticise and make suggestions. Grey and 
Churchill wanted no further weakening of our words. The Germans would be obviously 
at an advantage over us in a neutrality basis subject to existing treaties, as they had a 
triple alliance and we had nothing… 111 
That this was indeed the case was brought home to Grey when on 1 August 1914 the shocked 
French Ambassador in London reacted with dismay to the possibility of British neutrality: ‘If 
you stay out and we survive, we shall not move a finger to save you from being crushed by 
the Germans later’, he threatened.112 He was stating what many had feared all along: Britain 
could not afford to abandon France and risk her wrath, and she could not afford to antagonize 
Russia and risk her victory against Germany. Even one of the most notorious anti-Germans in 
the Foreign Office, Sir Eyre Crowe, confessed in his famous 1907 memorandum, that there 
was one thing which would frighten him more than Germany, namely to have both France 
and Russia against us.113 In Herbert Butterfield’s assessment,  
Britain […] was adopting a special attitude to the aggressions of Russia because 
she was “on our side”. This enabled her to […] avoid comparing power with 
power, aggression with aggression […]. It left Germany standing as simply the 
supremely wicked ogre, the condemnation of which was not to be offset by any 
proofs that Russia had dangerous ambitions and meant to achieve them by 
military force. For the same reason, British diplomats (and later historians) were 
unwilling or unable to see that Germany might have a genuine fear of Russia, and 
that this might account for some elements of intransigence in her policy that 
seemed unreasonable.114 
British decision-makers realised that Russia was a serious potential threat for Germany. For 
example, in March 1914 British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan reported from St 
Petersburg that once Russia’s army increases were complete in 1917, ‘the days of 
[Germany’s] hegemony in Europe will be numbered’. Until then, Germany ‘may be tempted 
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to precipitate a conflict before Russia is fully prepared to meet it.’ He used this opportunity to 
urge Grey to commit to helping Russia: ‘During these crucial years, therefore, Russia will 
stand in need of our support; and, should we fail to give it when she appeals for it, England 
will no longer be numbered among her friends.’115 Consequently, there were voices in the 
Foreign Office who considered that ‘the first principle of our foreign policy must be 
genuinely good relations with Russia.’116 It was also not lost on London that Germany also 
had much to fear from Britain, whose role in a future war could prove decisive. A letter from 
Loreburn to Runciman of April 1912 illustrates this point. 
The Germans are really afraid of us, lest we be trapped into joint action against 
them with France and Russia. We are afraid of their fleet policy – no wonder. And 
this fearful element of distrust will poison our relations. […] for God’s sake let us 
be civil and let anybody understand that nothing will induce us to join in war, 
unless Germany outrages fair play.117 
A counter-factual question begs to be asked in this context. What if Germany had not put in 
place the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ with its violation of Belgium in 1914 and thus demonstrated to 
those doubting the wisdom of a British intervention on the continent that Germany did indeed 
‘outrage fair play’? The violation of Belgium united the British public and the Cabinet, even 
if Belgium was not a key concern for Grey and his advisers in their July discussions. As Grey 
remembered after the war:  
the Cabinet was […] up to the time when violation of Belgian neutrality became 
imminent, unable to give any pledge to anybody, and in that it reflected the state of 
feeling and opinion in Parliament and the country. By 1 August, after Germany had 
evaded the request to respect Belgium’s neutrality, this period of indecision […] was 
coming to an end.118 
The German government not only speculated that a localised war would be of benefit to the 
Dual Alliance, and that a European war, should it break out, would still be winnable – it also 
saw the crisis as an opportunity to implore Grey to mediate and perhaps to effect a breach of 
trust between Britain and Russia.119 Thus Bethmann Hollweg mused on 8 July: ‘If war does 
not come, if the Tsar does not want it or concerned France counsels peace then we still have 
the chance to break the Entente apart over this.’120 
However, despite this Entente cornerstone and a distinct Germanophobe tendency among 
many in the Foreign Office, continuing tensions with Germany were not inevitable. During 
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1913, Anglo-German relations improved. According to Lloyd George, in an interview in 
January 1914, this was due to the ‘wise and patient diplomacy of Grey’.121 The Cabinet was 
not without advocates of a more positive policy towards Germany, among them Lord 
Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Haldane, the Secretary of State for war, and James 
Bryce, the Chief Secretary for Ireland,122 but they were outnumbered by the anti-German 
faction. Could an Anglo-German rapprochement in 1914 have changed the course of history? 
Certainly, Otte goes as far as to speculate: ‘Had the fatal crisis come a year later, the decision 
might well have been a different one.’123  
A significant part of the explanation for this new détente was that the naval race had 
essentially been decided – and in Britain’s favour. ‘I am firmly convinced that one of the 
reasons why Anglo-German relations are now more cordial […] is that we have entirely 
ceased to discuss the question of a limitation of armaments,’ commented Crowe in February 
1913.124 Instead of the navy, Germany had started to concentrate its efforts on military 
expansion. Expanding her army and keeping pace with the military build-up of Russia was 
the priority, and the navy played little part in the war planning of the General Staff, or indeed 
once fighting had begun. 
But given the importance of the Entente for Britain, friendly relations with Germany were not 
really a possibility, as Grey undoubtedly knew. Ambassador Goschen summed this up 
perfectly: ‘I am sure we cannot have it both ways: i.e. form a defensive alliance with France 
and Russia and at the same time be on cordial terms with Germany.’125 Consequently, British 
foreign policy rested on the premise that it was best to try and avoid making ‘a definite 
choice’.126 To some contemporaries, however, there was no real choice to be made. When in 
May 1914 Crown Prince Wilhelm discussed the possibility of an Anglo-German 
rapprochement with junior members of the British Embassy in Berlin (‘The future was to the 
Anglo-German race, and if England and Germany were wise they would join together in a 
regular Alliance and keep the other nations to order’127), Nicolson commented:  
I am quite sure that if we broke away from Russia and embarked on such an 
engagement we should bitterly rue the day. Russia would be able to make herself 
exceedingly disagreeable to us in regions where we are unfortunately very weak 
and where German assistance, even if willingly offered, would be of no avail, - 
indeed could not be operative.128 
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One reason for the failure of détente was the secret Anglo-Russian naval negotiations in the 
spring of 1914 which – due to the activities of a spy in the Russian embassy in London – did 
not remain a secret, and which killed ‘that tender plant of Anglo-German détente’.129 Grey 
approved the talks because he was ‘haunted by the fear that Russia might become tired of us 
and strike a bargain with Germany.’130 The news of the secret talks poisoned any hope in 
Germany of more cordial relations and only heightened the sense of encirclement and despair 
in Berlin. They destroyed what little trust Bethmann Hollweg had in Grey – based in large 
part on Lichnowsky’s optimistic reports from London, and confirmed Wilhelm II’s paranoias. 
If the Chancellor, and more so the Kaiser, had previously suspected Grey to have been a liar, 
now they were convinced of it. The rumours of Anglo-German naval talks caused near panic 
in Germany. Kurt Riezler’s diary is testament to the devastating impression the news had 
made in Berlin: 
The secret news which he [Bethmann Hollweg] tells me gives a devastating 
impression. He considers the Anglo-Russian negotiations about a naval 
convention, the landing in Pomerania, as very serious, the last piece in the chain. 
[…]  Russia’s military power increasing fast; if strategic expansion of Poland, the 
situation can be held in check. Austria increasingly weaker and immobile […]. In 
any case unable to go to war as our ally for a German cause. The Entente knows 
that we are entirely paralysed as a result. I am shocked, I had not regarded [the 
situation] as that serious.131 
However, the fact that more cordial relations were not achieved cannot be explained by just 
looking at London and at the power-play between those in favour of a pro-German policy and 
those bent on maintaining the Entente with France at all cost. The failure was also due to 
Germany’s attitude. Before the July Crisis, she had not missed any opportunities to provoke 
enmity and suspicion among the Entente Powers with her erratic and aggressive behaviour.  
In the summer of 1914, the German government was not willing to compromise even when 
the signs from London were clear. As Otte explains: ‘The problem […] was not what Grey 
said; the problem was that Berlin did not listen to its own ambassador.’132 Lichnowsky’s 
frequent warnings, during and before the July Crisis, were simply ignored. In February 1914, 
for example, Jagow urged the constantly cautioning Lichnowsky to be  
a little more optimistic in the assessment of our English friends. I would like to 
think that you sometimes see things too negatively, also when you express the 
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view that England would in any case be found on the side of France against us in 
case of war. We did not build our fleet for nothing, and it is my conviction that 
when it comes to it they will consider very carefully the question in England 
whether it really is all that easy and devoid of danger to play France’s guardian 
angel.133 
In the months and years before the summer of 1914, Germany’s erratic and aggressive 
behaviour and posturing affected the actions of the governments of the other great powers.  It 
therefore seems clear that Britain’s foreign policy makers did not need ‘effectively [to] invent 
[…] for [Germany] designs of a hegemonial character upon Europe’, as Keith Wilson has 
argued.134 Germany posed an actual threat to the established order. Britain’s anti-German 
foreign policy did not help, but it was arguably not the only cause of the international 
tensions that resurfaced repeatedly. Whether the threat was real or invented, it did not help 
make Germany more popular with Grey and his entourage, but it made the Foreign Office 
more forgiving of Russia. 
As for Grey’s alleged duplicity and his failure during the July Crisis to warn Germany 
sufficiently of his resolve to defend France, there were in fact plenty of early warnings, and it 
seems disingenuous for Germany’s leaders to feign surprise and outrage at the British 
‘betrayal’. On 9 July, for example, Grey had made it clear to Lichnowsky that ‘in no case 
would Britain be found on the side of the aggressor in the event of continental 
complications.’135 However, Germany’s military leaders weighed up the relative certainty of 
a war which involved Britain, but which Germany could win, with the fear of a future in 
which Germany would no longer be able to defend itself. ‘In a few years Russia will, in all 
competent assumptions, be ready to strike. Then she will suffocate us with the number of her 
soldiers, then she will have built her Baltic fleet and her strategic railways. In the meantime 
our group is getting weaker.’136 A mixture of fear and aggression motivated Germany’s 
government to take steps towards a European war in 1914. But it is important to state clearly 
that neither Grey’s secret commitment to France (which the Cabinet and Parliament were 
unaware of), nor his attitude during the crisis made the slightest difference to Germany’s 
resolve. They would have preferred Britain to be neutral, without a doubt, but they were 
going ahead with their war regardless. 
‘There is something very crude and almost childlike about German diplomacy’, H.H. Asquith 
commented on 30 July in response to Germany’s desperate bid for British neutrality.137 Grey 
called it a ‘policy of political blackmail’ and acknowledged that this had been the reason for 
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Britain’s change of foreign policy since the 1890s.138 During the July Crisis, Grey realised 
the gravity of the situation before anyone else, and Otte’s defence of Grey is unequivocal: 
much of the criticism levelled at Grey is ‘quite unjustified’.139 Nonetheless, it seems also 
clear that the German decision-makers’ distrust of Grey and of Britain undoubtedly worsened 
matters. Neither country’s foreign policy developed within a vacuum and neither country’s 
foreign policy makers trusted the other. But in 1914, the threat from Germany was current 
and real, while Russia’s potential enmity was a more distant, if much dreaded, prospect.  
It is easy to see why there has been so much debate about Grey and the origins of the war. It 
is possible to make convincing cases both for and against his culpability. Leaving aside the 
question whether a less anti-German policy might have helped prevent a war, it seems 
without doubt that Grey’s decision-making in 1914 was pragmatic. He was restricted by 
conflicting domestic and foreign policy constraints on his ability to manoeuvre, and 
motivated to accept the necessity for war because he feared the consequences of a German 
victory for Britain’s future security and for the future of the Empire.140 However, it is clear 
that a war was not in Britain’s interest in 1914 and that Grey was sincere in his hopes and 
efforts to stop it from breaking out. 
During the July Crisis, Grey’s attitude was characterised by his conviction that neutrality was 
not an option for Britain, and by his determination to mediate and to avert the outbreak of war 
if at all possible. The second concern was undoubtedly motivated by the first – the only way 
to keep Britain out of a war was to avoid that war breaking out altogether. So his mediation 
proposals, however much they may have been based on naivety or wishful thinking, were 
very much genuine. Many would agree with this interpretation. Grey ‘hated the idea of war 
between any of the great powers: “that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia 
would be detestable.”’141 He ‘could not concede that any government could knowingly 
unleash such a catastrophe and hoped that Britain’s naval margin and diplomatic disposition 
would deter the Germans.’142 Consequently, Grey pursued a policy of ‘constructive 
ambiguity’ throughout the crisis.143 He knew that Britain’s best option to preserve peace was 
to try for mediation, and he was in no doubt about Britain’s unenviable position: ‘We are 
going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand 
aside.’144 
 
3. The View from London and the View from Berlin 
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In this final section, it will be argued that Grey was ultimately not in a position to prevent the 
outbreak of war, no matter what he, or his later critics, believed. If we change the lens 
through which we view his actions, the limitations to his agency become readily apparent. 
The view from London naturally overemphasizes British agency. However, if Germany’s 
foreign policy did actually threaten the European balance of power (i.e. the threat was not 
invented, but real), then arguably Grey did not have potential to be either a hero or a villain. 
He was able to attempt to broker peace – whether half-heartedly or genuinely – and his 
suggestions may have been based on ‘partisan indifference to the power-political realities of 
Austria-Hungary’s situation’145 or may have aimed at a ‘far-reaching settlement’ which 
amounted to ‘a diplomatic triumph on a silver salver’ for Berlin.146 Regardless, the actual 
decisions for war were taken elsewhere, and Britain’s attitude in the end did not make a 
difference to the outcome of the crisis.  
All of the other great powers proceeded as they wished without any recourse to British 
counsel. Germany attacked Belgium and France, regardless of clear British warnings not to 
do so. Russia mobilised before a British decision on intervention had been taken and 
‘threatened to undermine British diplomacy’. France had not restrained Russia although 
Britain had requested it.147 For Austria-Hungary, Britain mattered even less – she had 
decided to make a diplomatic settlement of the crisis impossible by bombarding Belgrade 
immediately after declaring war on Serbia on 28 July, even when Grey was still attempting to 
arrange mediation. Only Italy’s decision for neutrality was affected by Britain’s intervention; 
once it was clear that Britain would be involved, Italian neutrality was a foregone conclusion, 
as she could not risk a hostile British Navy on its shores. This suggests that Britain played a 
far less important role in July 1914 than British diplomats (and later historians) have 
assumed, for their actions were of little consequence to the decisions taken by other great 
powers. 
The view from London, while illuminating, cannot provide the answers for the long debate on 
the origins of the First World War. Decisions taken in Vienna, Berlin, St Petersburg and Paris 
were far more instrumental and were taken regardless of London’s position and regardless of 
Grey’s resolve. Grey could not prevent the war once the decision was taken in Austria-
Hungary and Germany to use this crisis ‘for a final and fundamental reckoning […] with the 
Serbs’ and ‘to solve the Serbian question’ (in Vienna) as well as to test the Entente (in 
Berlin).148 
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It is not enough to condemn Grey’s apparent intransigence vis-a-vis Germany and the anti-
German stance in the Foreign Office without due reference to Germany’s erratic and 
threatening behaviour which produced the anti-German attitude in the first place.  The war of 
1914 could only have been avoided if all sides had favoured a peaceful outcome. War did not 
break out because of the decisions taken by Grey and the British Cabinet during the July 
Crisis. The decision for war and peace in Europe was not Grey’s to take. 
Equally it is not enough to condemn Bethmann Hollweg’s or Kaiser Wilhelm’s stubbornness 
in rejecting any suggestions of limiting the naval arms race in exchange for more cordial 
relations, and to deny that Germany also felt threatened by other countries around her. Each 
side acted within the confines of their own domestic and foreign policy concerns and 
limitations, and within real and imagined scenarios which threatened the future of their 
country. In other words, Germany’s aggressive posturing may have been the result of deep-
seated insecurities or of belligerence. Historians would do well to agree to disagree on this 
contentious point, for in the end, it matters little to the outcome. Germany appeared 
aggressive to its neighbours, and the motivation for this aggressiveness was of no concern to 
Grey and others who reacted to the perceived threat from Berlin. 
In the context of Germany posturing, the Entente with France really was the only reliable 
constellation for Britain. To jettison it would risk the country’s total isolation.  Germany had 
a triple alliance, we had nothing’, as Pease recorded in his diary in 1912. This was an 
unenviable position at the time when many expected a European war to be a likely future 
scenario.149 Britain had as much, if not more, to fear from a hostile Russia than from 
Germany. After all, as Butterfield put it, there were ‘two giants in Europe: Germany and 
Russia’, both of them ‘monsters’.150 But when faced with the real and current threat 
emanating from Germany the British government was willing to overlook that Russia, too, 
posed a potential future threat. 
It is a pointless counterfactual to ask whether a pro-German attitude in the Foreign Office 
might have prevented the war. Russia may well have been a danger in future, but Germany 
was the current threat. A pro-German attitude would most likely have spurred the Germans 
on to believing that their blustering foreign policy actually worked, making them more rather 
than less dangerous. An example of this thinking is Alfred von Tirpitz’s astonishing 
observation that ‘the risk-theory is working’ when it looked for a brief moment as if British 
neutrality had been secured on 1 August.151 It had long been the intention of Germany’s 
leaders to bully Britain into friendlier relations with her. 
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But being in an alliance did not provide much comfort for Germany. She found herself in an 
unenviable Mittellage, surrounded, possibly encircled, by potential enemies, with Austria-
Hungary as her only reliable friend. And for how much longer? It was widely considered that 
Austria’s great power standing was waning, and the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was 
seen as further evidence of this. Italy had long been known to be unreliable, particularly of 
course if Britain were to intervene in a continental war. Anti-German sentiments in London, 
of which Berlin was only too aware, contributed to feelings of insecurity in Germany. All the 
while, Russia was becoming an increasingly formidable power which terrified German 
political and military decision-makers. Britain acknowledged that Germany had much to fear 
from her eastern neighbour, a fear that was palpable and often-expressed by Germany’s 
military and political leaders. For example, on 20 July Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
confided in this private secretary: ‘Russia’s increasing demands and incredible explosive 
power. In a few years no longer possible to fend off, particularly if the current European 
constellation remains.’ A few days earlier, he had worried that ‘the future belongs to Russia 
which grows and grows and lies on us like an ever-heavier nightmare.’152 
Whether Grey really negotiated honestly for peace in July 1914 will remain a matter of 
dispute. But the fact remains that those who precipitated the crisis and deliberately escalated 
it were not interested in mediation, however half-hearted or sincere. As Grey bemoaned in his 
memoirs, ‘although the suggestion of settling [the crisis] by the same machinery as in 1912 
was made, it was dismissed peremptorily by Germany and Austria.’153  
In the end, Grey’s hands were tied as Britain found herself having to choose between an 
almost certain Germany victory which would see her gaining a position of hegemony on the 
continent, and losing her only near-allies, France and Russia. When Grey managed to sway 
the doubters in the Cabinet, it was because Germany committed the Belgian outrage which 
was necessary to convince them, and the public, that Britain could not remain on the margins.  
It has been argued that British foreign policy ‘had always depended on scenarios of threat and 
invasion’.154 If that was so, then Germany was only too happy to oblige. The scenarios did 
not have to be invented.155 When examined from a British perspective, it is perfectly feasible 
to argue that the Foreign Office was ‘quite hysterical’ about the perceived ‘ridiculous’ (and 
‘invented’) German threat.156 However, the view from Berlin leads to a different 
interpretation. If there was near hysteria in London, there was also a very real threat from 
Berlin. Even German contemporaries realised this. For example, Gottlieb von Jagow alluded 
to the period of more cordial relations between Britain and Germany in 1913, when he 
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thought that the ‘era of misunderstandings’ which had characterised Anglo-German relations 
since 1889 had come to an end. These misunderstandings he put down largely to German 
actions and mistakes.157 It might well be true that this threat usefully underlined the kind of 
foreign policy Grey wanted to pursue anyway – but in conjuring up images of a hostile 
Germany, he was by no means fighting windmills. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporaries and historians have levelled harsh criticisms at Sir Edward Grey, and even 
after a hundred years he remains central to debates around the causes of the war. Criticism 
has focused on his anti-German policy in the pre-war years and his conduct during the July 
Crisis.  
It has been argued here that while Grey’s and the Foreign Office’s anti-German stance 
appears to have contributed to the international tensions which culminated in the war of 1914,  
a German threat to British security was real, rather than invented. As to Grey’s role in the 
July Crisis, it has been shown that while Grey undoubtedly played in important role as one of 
the ‘men of 1914’, and while he was sincere in trying to prevent the outbreak of war, there 
were limits to what he could actually achieve. In terms of Grey’s ability to prevent 
international conflict and the outbreak of a major war, he was peripheral. Regardless of his 
anti-German stance, and whether or not he favoured the Entente or perhaps dreaded Russia 
more than Germany, he was in no position to prevent a war that was seen in Vienna and 
Berlin as a last chance to break the Entente apart or to achieve a quick victory against France 
and Russia. Even if a clear announcement from London early in July had pitted Britain firmly 
against the Triple Alliance, the resolve in Vienna for a ‘reckoning’ with Serbia would not 
have changed, and neither would the determination in Berlin to support its only reliable ally 
and to test the Entente’s readiness for war.    
Berlin’s decision-makers were unaware of the divisions in the Cabinet, but they had in any 
case plenty of evidence to suggest that Britain would not stay neutral in a future war. It did 
not matter to them either way. They proceeded with their ‘dust-laden’ plan regardless. Thus it 
was not necessary for the anti-German faction in the Foreign Office to invent a German 
threat, though it would appear that they were very willing to conjure it up whenever it suited. 
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Germany constituted a threat to the European balance of power, while at the same time 
Germany considered herself threatened by hostile powers around her. Both of these fears 
were valid and could exist simultaneously. 
But why did Germany risk it all, when the stakes were so high and the risks so great? In an 
attempt to address this conundrum, Jonathan Steinberg refers to Friedrich Meinecke’s 
revealing assessment of Radowitz’s defeat at Olmütz. 
So the defeat he suffered was probably certain from the beginning, and we know 
that he went into the struggle with a premonition of defeat. Yet there are battles in 
history which have to be fought out quite unavoidably even if defeat stares you in 
the eye. 
Published in 1913, it is likely that Germany’s leading statesmen would have read, and 
doubtless shared, Meinecke’s assessment. Steinberg points out that for the purposes of 
understanding Germany before the war, it pays to remember that many Germans at the time 
thought it was worth fighting certain battles even if defeat was likely. ‘That itself’, concludes 
Steinberg, ‘would be enough to set limits to the achievements of British diplomacy in its 
relations with the German Empire.’158 With this in mind, Henry Wilson was far from the 
truth when he mused in March 1919 that ‘[w]e know for a certainty that if Germany had 
thought for a moment that Great Britain would go in with France and Russia, she would 
never have undertaken the enterprise.’159 Even if the view from London could attribute such 
importance to British decision-making and such agency to Grey, from the perspective of 
Berlin, neither Britain nor Sir Edward Grey were of such central importance. 
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